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Abstract
The role of monetary policy during periods of asset price volatility has been the subject
of discussion among economists and policymakers at least since the 1920s and the Great
Depression that followed. In this paper we survey the recent and rapidly growing literature
on this topic, with an emphasis on the investment channel. We present a detailed discussion
of the hypotheses that have been used to justify, or criticise, a response to asset prices.
These hypotheses concern imperfections in ¯nancial markets, bubbles in asset prices, and
the information on which ¯rm managers and central banks base their decisions.
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11 Introduction
The recent experience with booms and busts in asset prices, especially in Japan
and the USA, originated a heated debate on the relation between stock prices and
monetary policy. Naturally, the events surrounding the Great Depression had already
led to a discussion of this issue, but systematic study of it became topical only in the
late 1990s | see, e.g., White (2004a). It is also the case that in recent years monetary
policy has been often represented by a \simple interest rate rule", i.e., an equation
that relates the nominal interest rate (the policy instrument) to a small number
of variables thought to be the ones policymakers look at when taking decisions.
These would normally include the output gap and in°ation (actual or expected). It
has been found in several papers that simple rules may approximate optimal rules,
though the result is obviously not general | e.g., see the discussion in Taylor (1999).
The main question addressed by those studying the relation between asset prices and
monetary policy has therefore been: Should monetary policy react to movements in
(real) asset prices in a way that goes beyond their actual or foreseen impact on
output and, especially, in°ation? That is, are simple rules that exclude asset prices
enough to take into account the importance of asset prices to economic management?
In this paper we survey the current state of this relatively new, but fast-growing,
body of literature. We focus our attention on that part of the literature that
has highlighted the link between equity prices and real economic activity that is
provided by the \investment channel." That is to say, we shall discuss whether
and how °uctuations in asset prices may trigger °uctuations in investment, and
what consequences these may have for the economy. Two main issues have been
addressed. One is the possibility that, through a \¯nancial accelerator" e®ect, asset
price movements may contribute to signi¯cantly magnify °uctuations in investment
and output.1 The other is that a change in investment caused by non-fundamental
movements in asset prices represents an ine±cient allocation, i.e., a deviation from
a frictionless benchmark model. The goal of the literature is then to assess whether
this channel justi¯es a special monetary policy response to movements in asset prices.
We narrow the focus to the investment channel primarily to limit the scope, and
2thus the size, of the survey. Nevertheless, though the earlier papers in the literature
on monetary policy and asset prices focused on the \wealth e®ect" of asset prices
on consumption, it is a common view that it is not clear that the wealth e®ect is
really that important.2 In fact, the more recent research has instead emphasised the
importance of equity prices to investment and the e®ects of an \over-accumulation"
of capital, and this is the research that we survey.
The literature is divided between those who believe the correct answer to the
question above to be \yes" | e.g., Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky, and Wadhwani
(2000) | and those who answer \no" | e.g. Bernanke and Gertler (1999). The
main problem when dealing with asset prices is that there may be a signi¯cant
non-fundamental component in them. Crucially, this component is non-observable.
In general, the \yes" side of the debate will attach little relevance to the di±culties
posed by the non-observability of the non-fundamental component, while the \no"
side will do just the opposite. Indeed, the consequences for investment and the
estimation of the non-fundamental component of asset prices have been two of the
main issues in the debate. Concerning the consequences, the literature surveyed in
section 2 reports mixed results: some studies ¯nd that investment is signi¯cantly
a®ected by non-fundamental movements in asset prices, whereas others ¯nd at most
a limited e®ect of asset prices on investment. As for estimation of misalignments,
Cecchetti et al. (2000) argue that it is no more di±cult than estimating other policy
variables such as the output gap. Cogley (1999) takes the opposite view and goes
as far as to suggest that reacting to (inaccurately) estimated misalignments might
even be destabilising. Closely related to this di±culty is another important problem
with including asset prices in the policy rule: it could lead to indeterminacy | see
Bullard and Schaling (2002). If asset prices respond to monetary policy actions,
and monetary policy reacts to asset prices, then there is no anchor and the result is
indeterminacy. In fact, another strand of the literature has emphasised the impact
of monetary policy on asset prices, and what reacting to asset prices might imply
for asset markets. Though there is evidence that equity prices react to monetary
policy | see, e.g., Bernanke and Kuttner (2004) and the references therein | the
3magnitude and timing of that reaction are uncertain. This would advise policymakers
to be cautious when attempting to in°uence equity prices, or not to try it at all.
Besides, the psychology of investors is still ill understood. Thus, the way market
participants would respond to actual or expected steps taken by monetary policy to
steer equity prices is unpredictable and might endanger market stability | see, e.g.,
the discussion of communication problems of the central bank in Filardo (2004).
There are actually three views in this debate: those who believe monetary policy
should react to asset prices themselves (e.g., Bordo and Jeanne, 2002); those who
believe monetary policy should react only to misalignments in asset prices (e.g.,
Dupor, 2002); and those who believe monetary policy should just not react to asset
price °uctuations in any special way (e.g., Gilchrist and Leahy, 2002). If asset prices
re°ect only fundamentals, then the second and third groups will advocate no reaction.
The ¯rst group stress the non-linear e®ects that asset price movements may have. In
particular, asset prices may be important for determining the collateral available
for borrowing. If asset prices collapse, possibly because of weak fundamentals,
the economy may be caught in a credit-crunch situation, with potentially very
damaging consequences for the economy as a whole. Therefore, according to this
group, monetary policy should be preemptive, i.e., it should also aim at preventing
excessive °uctuations in asset prices. Members of the second group will typically
either not model these e®ects, or attach little quantitative importance to them.
On the other hand, members of the third group tend to believe that an \in°ation
targeting" framework | in a sense to be clari¯ed in section 3 | is the adequate
regime for monetary policy. Monetary policy should then focus on in°ation forecasts
alone. Asset prices (and, for that matter, any other variable) will be relevant if, and
only if, they help forecast in°ation. Attempting to moderate asset price movements
will be, to this group, beyond the remit of monetary policy.
In this paper we discuss these arguments by means of a sticky-price model
with endogenous investment, possibly driven by non-fundamental movements in
asset prices. We discuss the potential bene¯ts, in terms of output and in°ation
stabilisation, of employing a monetary policy rule that reacts to asset prices. At
4some point we will assume that equity prices may be contaminated by sentiment |
i.e., deviations from rationality or mistaken expectations | and that this distorts
¯rms' investment decisions: managers cannot disentangle sentiment and information
about fundamentals, leading to \wrong" investment decisions. If there is a bubble
in stock prices, this may result in excessive capital accumulation relatively to the
frictionless benchmark.
In section 2 we discuss, through the presentation of theories and evidence on
the relationship between stock prices and investment, what role asset prices play
in the explanation of investment °uctuations and whether the existence of some
form of irrational exuberance in the stock market may induce ¯rms to invest beyond
what fundamentals suggest. In fact, there is by now enough evidence that stock
returns predict investment | see, e.g., Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) | but
the channels that make that correlation hold are not so evident. The most cited
channels between stock prices and investment are Tobin's q, the active informant
hypothesis and the balance sheet channel provided by imperfections in ¯nancial
markets.
Section 3 discusses the policy evaluation approaches used in the literature, which
¯t well in what Taylor (2000) has named the \new normative macroeconomics"
method. In section 4 we describe a sticky-price model with endogenous investment
and adjustment costs where asset prices may be driven by a non-fundamental shock.
This model will serve as a guide to the literature under survey. Issues will be
discussed taking the model as reference. Section 5 presents conclusions and directions
for future work.
2 Stock prices, investment and the real economy
Although there are several channels through which asset prices may impinge on the
real economy, in this paper we focus on the e®ects that go through the investment
channel. The opposite views of Bosworth (1975) and Fischer and Merton (1984)
illustrate the divergence in the literature on the e®ects of market valuations on
5investment. On one side, Bosworth argues that although stock market and ¯rms'
investment are closely related, since the stock market will try to evaluate the value
generated by ¯rms' investments, managers should ignore the information coming
from the market and base their investment decisions on their own valuation of
fundamentals. In this case the stock market would be a sideshow with no e®ect
on investment decisions.
On the other side, Fischer and Merton (1984) argue that managers should simply
consider the stock market valuation and use investor sentiment to the advantage of
their company. In the authors' opinion, whether or not they coincide with their own
assessment of fundamentals, ¯rms should react to stock-price changes when taking
their investment decisions: ¯rms should follow investor exuberance. In this case
non-fundamental movements in asset prices a®ect investment and, therefore, the real
economy, providing a possible justi¯cation for the intervention of monetary policy.
The main elements relating asset price movements to °uctuations in investment are
Tobin's q, the active informant hypothesis and the balance sheet channel. This
section describes these.
2.1 The credit view
Traditionally, theories of the monetary transmission mechanism have stressed the
direct e®ects of interest rates and exchange rates on output components, and then,
indirectly, on in°ation. In particular, changes in the real interest rate would cause
investment to adjust to react to the changing cost of capital. However, an old
tradition in macroeconomics that focused on the importance of ¯nancial markets in
the transmission of monetary policy and other shocks has recently been recovered.
The recent survey by Trautwein (2000) provides an historical appraisal of this \credit
view" in macroeconomics, contrasting it with the once dominant \money view." This
renewed interest arises essentially from the belief of policymakers and theorists that
the structure of ¯nancial markets may amplify the e®ects of shocks and, therefore,
output °uctuations.
The basic insight is that ¯nancial markets are plagued by problems related
6to information asymmetries and incentive compatibility. These problems are of
relevance to the conduct of monetary policy for they also provide a channel |
the credit channel | through which monetary policy may have larger real e®ects.
In addition, this credit view stresses the asymmetries that result from ¯nancial
constraints, which may depend on movements in asset prices.
The link between stock prices and investment provided by the balance sheet
channel is studied, for example, in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke et al.
(1999). In this case, the link between stock prices and investment works through
their e®ects on the ¯nancial structure of ¯rms. In a world where capital markets
are characterised by imperfect information and incentive and enforcement problems,
the cost of borrowing depends on the ¯nancial position of agents and, therefore, a
increase (decrease) in asset prices increases (decreases) the market value of borrowers'
collateral and their ability to borrow and invest. These e®ects may be highly
damaging for the economy in the special case when a bubble in asset prices bursts, as
the experiences of the Great Depression and of Japan in the 1990s seem to suggest.
How much of investment °uctuations are explained by \fundamental" shocks
alone and by the ampli¯cation provided by the structure of ¯nancial markets is
what Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) study. They ¯nd that, for the average ¯rm
in their sample, ¯nancial factors raise the impact of a shock on investment by 25%
relative to a benchmark situation with no frictions in ¯nancial markets. Hubbard
(1998) surveys earlier empirical work, also concluding that ¯nancial frictions appear
to matter.
2.2 Investment, fundamentals and ¯nancial frictions
The standard theory for Tobin's q is presented in Tobin (1969), where q stands for the
ratio of the market's valuation of capital to its replacement cost. According to this
theory an increase in stock prices increases the value of capital relative to the cost
of acquiring new capital and thus increases investment demand by ¯rms. However,
several studies (see, for example, Barro, 1990; Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers, 1993;
Chirinko, 1993) have shown that Tobin's q is not a good predictor of investment, at
7least when compared to other variables.
A ¯rst problem in the empirical literature on investment is that fundamentals are
unobservable by the econometrician and therefore a proxy has to be chosen | sales
and cash °ow in Morck et al. (1990) and pro¯ts (or its expected present discounted
value) as in Blanchard et al. (1993) | and the results are not independent of the
choice. Another problem is the choice of the variable to represent market valuation,
that is, Tobin's q or the stock price.
The use of q can easily result in measurement-error problems, given the problems
involved in the computation of q. On one side, there are the di±culties in computing
a series for capital at replacement cost. On the other side, the relevant variable
for investment, in theory, is marginal q, which is very hard to measure because of
the di±culties in determining the market value of a marginal unit of capital. To
circumvent this problem, average q is used instead, which is based on the total value
of capital. Two recent papers, Bond, Cummins, Eberly, and Shiller (2000) and
Bond and Cummins (2001), mention noise in equity prices as an explanation for the
empirical failure of the q model.
At least since the seminal work of Shiller (1981), theoretical and empirical work
suggest that fashions and fads, and not only fundamentals, a®ect asset prices. In a
series of papers, most of them collected in Shiller (1989), Shiller and others looked
for evidence on the relative importance to asset price movements of changes in
economic fundamentals and changes in opinion or psychology. Although the answer
to this question is still not well established owing to statistical di±culties, there is
a broad consensus today that stock prices exhibit more volatility than is justi¯ed
by fundamentals. Given these ¯ndings, several authors (e.g., Robert Shiller, Andrei
Shleifer, James Poterba, Lawrence Summers, among others) have been proposing
behavioural theories, models of contagion of opinion and behaviour, fads and bubbles,
to provide an explanation for the empirical ¯ndings that have raised doubts about
the e±cient markets hypothesis, and therefore to justify marked and prolonged
deviations of asset prices from fundamentals.
The study of the relationship between stock prices and investment is of great
8interest during periods of marked deviations of stock prices from fundamentals. If
there is some irrational exuberance in the stock market driving prices up because
investors believe in a New Era economy, as described in Shiller (2000), then ¯rms may
be \forced" to follow that enthusiasm and invest beyond what would be warranted
by fundamentals.
The 1920s and the Great Depression that followed and the crash of 1987, have
been studied as periods during which asset prices deviated markedly from fundamentals.
The examination of both periods by Barro (1990) led this author to conclude that
managers do not follow the market valuation closely in their investment decisions.
Firms invested less during the 1920s than implied by market valuation; and after
the 1929 crash, investment fell more than the fall in the stock market would suggest.
In the case of the 1987 crash, the author concludes that, when investing, ¯rms must
have considered information other than market valuation. The overall conclusion is
that stock prices outperform a standard q-variable in explaining investment and that
stock prices are an important determinant of US investment, especially for long-term
samples, and even when controlling for cash °ow variables.
Two other periods of marked deviations from the fundamentals are the second
half of the 1980s in Japan and the 1990s in the American economy. The Japanese
stock price index Nikkei 225 climbed from 11 543 in January 1985 to 38 916 in
January 1990 | an increase of 237% or an average annual growth rate of 27.5%.
The S&P 500 stock price index for the American economy climbed from 459 in
January 1995 to 1521 in September 2000 | an increase of 231% or an average annual
growth rate of 23.5%. During these periods, ¯xed capital investment increased at
an average annual real growth rate of 9%.3 Looking at the Japanese economy in
the 1980s, Chirinko and Schaller (2001) used di®erent types of evidence to conclude
that there was a bubble in the equity markets and that it a®ected business ¯xed
investment. The authors ¯rst con¯rm that the stock market boom of the late 1980s
coincided with high levels of business ¯xed investment and that, at the peak in
1989, the funds raised from securities issues covered almost 90% of the expenditures
on business ¯xed investment by the principal Japanese enterprises, when usually
9it covers only 30%. Using a non-structural forecasting equation and controlling
for other macroeconomic factors that might have a®ected investment, the authors
concluded that the investment/capital ratio was about 20% higher than predicted
by these factors in the late 1980s, but lower than predicted after the crash. This
evidence is reinforced by the use of orthogonality tests and parametric estimates;
from these they concluded that the bubble increased ¯xed investment by something
like 6 to 9% in the period 1987-89. The boom in stock prices and in ¯xed investment
in the American economy in the 1990s is certainly worthy of further research.
These studies by Barro (1990), Chirinko and Schaller (2001), and more recently
Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2002), ¯nd an important role for non-fundamental movements
in asset prices in explaining investment. But there is also contradicting evidence.
Morck et al. (1990) when revising the di®erent channels from stock prices to
investment, emphasise the one that stresses the fact that managers, when making
investment decisions, have in the stock market a source of information that may
or may not correctly describe future fundamentals. According to this view, the
active informant hypothesis, stock prices predict investment because they convey
relevant information to managers when deciding on investment. It is arguable that
the market does inform ¯rms' managers, which have to take investment decisions,
about, for example, the future state of the economy, namely, future aggregate or
individual demand. However, information contained in stock prices may accurately,
or inaccurately, predict fundamentals. It can inaccurately predict fundamentals
because of their inherent unpredictability \or because stock prices are contaminated
by sentiment that managers cannot separate from information about fundamentals"
(Morck et al. 1990, p. 164). In this case, sentiment | that is, the component
of stock prices that is not explained by fundamentals | may distort investment
decisions through the false signals it transmits to the managers. According to these
authors' terminology, in that case, the stock market will be a faulty active informant.
Morck et al. (1990) regress investment growth on stock returns and the growth
in fundamental variables in order to see how important the stock market is, after
controlling for fundamentals | the growth rates of sales and cash °ow. They try
10to answer the following question: If managers knew future fundamentals, would
orthogonal movements in share price still help predict their investment decisions?
Although they concluded that they could never reject the null hypothesis that
investor sentiment does not a®ect investment through the stock market, their results
suggest that it is not the most important factor in explaining investment. For
¯rm-level data they conclude that investor sentiment has a very small explanatory
power for investment and that the stock market is neither a complete sideshow, nor
one of the most important elements in explaining investment behaviour. The same
results were achieved using aggregate data.
Additional evidence is provided in the important paper on the e®ects of stock
prices on investment by Blanchard et al. (1993). These authors analyse whether
investment moves more with the stock market or with fundamentals, using time
series for the period 1900-1990. For fundamentals they employ two proxies: ¯rst,
the expected present discounted value of the pro¯t rate, conditional on information
available as of the time of investment; second, the pro¯t rate. When controlling for
fundamentals, and especially when they use pro¯ts as a proxy, they conclude that
market valuation has a limited e®ect in explaining investment behaviour over the
period of analysis and that the evidence goes strongly against the hypothesis that
managers simply follow the market valuation. However, they conclude that stock
prices matter. According to their estimates, a non-fundamental increase of 1% in
the market valuation leads to an increase in investment of 0.45%.
2.3 Summary
The overall conclusion from these empirical studies is that market valuation, when
one proxies fundamentals by cash °ow and pro¯ts, has a role, although a limited
one, in the determination of investment decisions. That is, the stock market is
not a sideshow; it a®ects real economic activity through its e®ect on investment.
Therefore, in the next sections we describe a model with endogenous investment
where the asset price is a®ected by a non-fundamental shock, that will allow us to
discuss the potential bene¯ts from monetary policy reacting to asset prices, in terms
11of in°ation and output stabilisation. As an introduction, we begin by discussing the
policy evaluation approach.
3 The approach to policy evaluation
It is standard nowadays in monetary policy models to assume that monetary policy
is implemented through simple (or optimal) rules for the nominal interest rate,
the central bank's instrument. Two main approaches have been used to study the
potential bene¯ts from monetary policy moderating the impact of movements in asset
prices. In the ¯rst approach, one evaluates the e®ects of letting the policy instrument
react to asset prices over and beyond the reaction to deviations of expected in°ation
from the target. In the second approach, assuming the central bank has perfect
information, one determines the optimal policy rule and assesses the importance of
its reaction to non-fundamental shocks. As discussed below, these approaches re°ect
di®erent ways of viewing and modelling an \in°ation-targeting" central bank.
The policy evaluation approach is usually based on the computation of an expected
loss for alternative policy rules that do or do not include some reaction to asset
prices. One can then compare the ability of those di®erent policy rules to stabilise
in°ation, output and the other variables of the system, when the economy is hit by
asset-market disturbances. The stability of the variables is usually evaluated in terms
of their variance. However, comparisons of the performance of di®erent policy rules
in the context of an otherwise unchanged model always bring to mind the \Lucas
critique." When the model employed is interpreted as \structural", as is common
with the forward-looking IS and Phillips curve equations that we will include in our
benchmark model, the modeler has some justi¯cation for arguing that the Lucas
critique is ine®ective. However, some authors | see, for example, Sims (2001) and
Estrella and Fuhrer (2002) | have been suggesting that, even in that case, a model
may still be a®ected by policy changes.
In the context that interests us here, it could be the case that bubbles or ¯rm
managers (non-rational) expectations are endogenous, i.e., responsive to monetary
12policy. Introducing this in the model would, in the most interesting formulations,
render it non-linear and bring in the di±culties mentioned in section 4.4. This is an
issue that has been under discussion and certainly deserves attention. One of the
arguments employed by those that favour a reaction to asset prices is that this will
also prevent non-fundamental movements in asset prices from developing. Critics
of this view argue that, given the information limitations of the central bank, the
impact of monetary policy actions on expectations and asset prices is hard to predict
and might actually be destabilising.
3.1 Policy rules
All monetary policy rules considered in our analysis are interest rate rules. The
exclusive use of interest rate rules for policy rests on the evidence that virtually
all industrialised countries' central banks use some short-term (nominal) interest
rate as their policy instrument | see Walsh (1998). Simple rules have been widely
discussed among academics and in wider discussions about monetary policy. Of
course, because simple rules do not use all the information available they will not in
general be optimal.4
Much of the discussion on whether monetary policy should react to asset prices
has been conducted in the context of an \in°ation targeting" regime.5 However,
di®erent representations of it have been made, leading to di®erent approaches of the
issue. It is therefore convenient to brie°y distinguish these di®erent views.
A narrow de¯nition of in°ation targeting is as a regime in which the interest rate
is set so as to achieve the target value for the forecast of the in°ation rate at an
appropriate horizon. Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) view in°ation targeting as a
regime in which central bankers can be modelled as setting interest rates using all
available information so as to optimize a welfare function that penalizes deviations
from the in°ation target alone (strict in°ation targeting), or also conceding some
weight to the output gap (°exible in°ation targeting). This view of in°ation targeting
has been used in papers that assess the role of non-fundamental shocks to asset prices
in the optimal policy rule | see, e.g, Bean (2003).
13However, the seminal studies by Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and Cecchetti,
Genberg, Lipsky, and Wadhwani (2000) view in°ation targeting in a looser way.
This looser de¯nition of in°ation targeting, following McCallum and Nelson (1999)
and others, is as a regime in which the policy instrument reacts to deviations of
expected in°ation from target, for a given horizon. On this looser de¯nition, a policy
would approximate more closely that under the narrower de¯nition (strict in°ation
targeting) the greater the strength of the response of the interest rate to the deviation
of in°ation from the target. It is argued that such forecast-based forward-looking
rules provide good approximations to the behaviour of in°ation targeting central
banks | see, for example, Svensson (1997).
We are now ready to brie°y describe the interest rate rules discussed in this
paper. The symbols used in the following equations are de¯ned as follows: it is
the nominal interest rate; ¼t is the in°ation rate; ~ yt is the output gap; qt is the
asset price; Ãxt is the non-fundamental shock in the investment equation. All are
measured as log-deviations from steady-state values.
In the looser view in°ation targeting corresponds to the use of a rule that sets
the nominal interest rate as a function of the deviations of the in°ation forecast,
for a de¯ned horizon, from the target. In log-deviation form, the target is zero for
in°ation (and also for the output gap, when it enters the policy rule). The policy
rule is usually written as:
it = °Et¼t+1 (1)
where i is the policy instrument, ° is the feedback parameter, and Et¼t+1 is the
expected next period in°ation, conditional on all the information available at time
t.
One possible alternative monetary policy is then one in which the monetary
policy rule reacts not only to deviations of in°ation from the target but also to the
current asset price:
it = °1Et¼t+1 + °2qt (2)
However, the optimal policy would call for a response to shocks rather than
expected in°ation or asset prices themselves, as the papers that adopt the stricter
14view of \in°ation targeting" unsurprisingly conclude. But the optimal rule is not
feasible; it is just a benchmark. Assuming the central bank can correctly identify the
non-fundamental shock, a preferable alternative to the previous simple rules would
be an in°ation-forecast targeting policy rule in which the policy instrument, instead
of reacting to the asset price, reacts to the non-fundamental shock itself:
it = °1Et¼t+1 + °3Ãt (3)
In this rule it is assumed that central banks can identify misalignments in asset
prices, while at the same time ¯rms either cannot identify them, or will base their
decisions on them anyway | recall the discussion in section 2 and Fischer and
Merton (1984)'s view of the subject. Whether such an assumption is tenable is
the subject of great controversy. Estimating misalignments in asset prices is a
di±cult task and highly dependent on the assumed model and the dataset | see
Alessandri (2004) for a recent study of the issue. In fact, this estimation problem is
the main source of divergence between Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and Cecchetti,
Genberg, Lipsky, and Wadhwani (2000): to the former, adjusting the simple rule's
parameters is su±cient to stabilise the economy without incurring the dangers of
wrongly estimating misalignments; to the latter, there are signi¯cant gains in supplementing
the simple rule's elements with misalignments in asset prices, which are no more
di±cult to estimate than, say, the output gap.
The Taylor rule is another simple rule frequently used in policy analyses. A
simple version of it is:
it = °4¼t + °5~ yt (4)
i.e., the interest rate is set in response to deviations of actual in°ation and the output
gap from the target. Starting from this baseline version, one might study the impact
of adding the same terms added above to the in°ation targeting policy rule.
After assigning values to the parameters in them, the alternative policy rules are
compared by computing the values of a, sometimes implicit, welfare loss function.
The loss function is what we discuss next.
153.2 Central banks' loss function
In what concerns the welfare loss function, we should also mention that although
the focus of analysis is the question of whether or not monetary policy should react
to asset prices over and above deviations of in°ation from the target, we are not
addressing the question of whether or not monetary policy should target asset prices
in the sense that they belong in the objective function. The dominant view is
that monetary policy should concentrate on goods and services in°ation and that
monetary policy should not aim at asset price stability. Therefore, the discussion
of whether or not central bankers should stabilise asset prices around fundamentals,
should be understood as a means to stabilise output and in°ation. Or, as Cecchetti,
Genberg, and Wadhwani (2003) make clear, the concern is how the central bank can
most e®ectively ful¯ll its objectives. Reacting to asset prices in order to stabilise the
economy and aiming to stabilise the ¯nancial markets are two di®erent things.
The welfare loss function usually considered in theoretical discussions has the
following form:










where µ is the discount factor and Â is the weight assigned to output stabilisation.
When µ tends to 1, the loss function approaches the \asymptotic loss function":
AL = V (¼t) + ÂV (~ yt) (6)
Sometimes | in the context of the optimal response to asset prices, an example
is Filardo (2001) | a modi¯ed version is used, where the volatility of the policy
instrument is included:
ALi = V (¼t) + ÂV (~ yt) + ÂiV (it ¡ it¡1) (7)
The inclusion of output and in°ation in the central bank's loss function re°ects
the wide agreement that they represent the most important concerns of policymakers
| even in°ation targeters as the Bank of England claim that they are not \in°ation
nutters", in King (1997)'s terminology. A similar loss can be derived from a microfounded
general equilibrium model without endogenous investment, as shown in Rotemberg
16and Woodford (1999), as a second-order approximation to the utility function of
the representative agent. The inclusion of an interest rate smoothing term in the
expected loss reduces volatility of the policy instrument and is justi¯ed, among other
reasons, because policymakers are concerned about ¯nancial stability | see Mishkin
(1999); alternative possibilities are discussed in Woodford (1999). On the same
grounds, Gruen, Plumb, and Stone (2003) consider including the variance of the
shock to an asset-price bubble in the welfare loss function. It is also important to
note that implicit in the use of the asymptotic loss is a disregard for issues related to
time-inconsistency. Groth (2003) explicitly takes into consideration the commitment
problem in the context of the debate on monetary policy and asset prices.
Nevertheless, to our knowledge, the sort of loss function presented above has
not yet been given proper microfoundations in a model with endogenous investment.
To overcome this di±culty, Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) use an apparently di®erent
approach to evaluate the performance of policy rules. They ¯rst simulate a real
business cycle (RBC) version of their model and then simulate New Keynesian
and ¯nancial accelerator versions of it under in°ation targeting rules. Given that
a frictionless economy yields maximum welfare, any deviation from it means a
reduction in welfare, if we ignore other possible distortions. Thus, Gilchrist and
Leahy assess the optimality of the rules by how close the variables' paths are to their
paths in the RBC version. This procedure actually amounts to de¯ning the \output
gap" as the di®erence between actual output and the output under the frictionless
RBC model. The implicit loss function would then be similar to the sum of squared
deviations of in°ation and of this rede¯ned output gap from zero. Here, a value
of zero corresponds to zero in°ation and output being on the same path as in the
corresponding RBC model.
One remaining di±culty, which Gilchrist and Leahy do not attempt to solve, is
giving a value to parameter Â, the weight of output in the loss function. A commonly
used option is Â = 1 (and Âi = 0:5 | see Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999). Another
di±culty is that in this sort of model it is not obvious why output deviations should
be taken as indicative of welfare losses. In principle, all variables relevant to the
17welfare function would have to be on the same path as in the RBC model for welfare
to be at its maximum. The variable that comes to mind as one strong candidate for
the job is consumption. Nevertheless, one may ask whether monetary policy should
be given the task of addressing all distortions.
Usually the output gap is computed as the di®erence between actual output and
the output under full price °exibility. This is what we do below. However, the
existence of imperfections in ¯nancial markets should also be taken into account,
which would require de¯ning a \parallel" frictionless model | the RBC model in
Gilchrist and Leahy (2002). The benchmark model that we shall discuss next does
not have ¯nancial market imperfections, only price stickiness. For our purposes, we
do not need to de¯ne the frictionless model. We would need to do so if we intended
to extend the analysis, for instance, to include numerical simulations.
4 A model-based discussion
Because of its high volatility and weight in aggregate demand, investment is seen,
at least since John Maynard Keynes, as a major determinant of the business cycle.
Therefore, with central banks aiming at stabilising in°ation and output, and given
the evidence presented above, we ask if there is something monetary policy can do
to improve things in periods of enthusiasm or optimism about the future, with stock
prices booming and ¯rms induced to invest beyond what fundamentals would imply
or, on the other hand, during a wave of pessimism, a crash in stock prices and delays
in the implementation of investment projects. That is, do the e®ects of asset price
movements on investment provide an argument for a reaction of monetary policy to
asset prices, in order to stabilise output and in°ation?
Bernanke and Gertler (1999) analyse the bene¯ts of monetary policy reacting
to asset prices in a small-scale dynamic New Keynesian model extended to allow
for ¯nancial accelerator e®ects | as developed in Bernanke et al. (1999) | and
for exogenous bubbles in asset prices, which a®ect investment, and therefore the
real economy, via the ¯nancial accelerator. In this model ¯rms' capital is ¯nanced
18through internally generated funds and by borrowing. As described above, because
there are credit-market frictions, stock price movements, through their impact on
¯rms' net worth, a®ect the collateral ¯rms can o®er to banks. This will in°uence
their costs of ¯nancing and thus a®ect investment. Therefore, in this model links
between changes in asset prices and the real economy work through the ¯nancial
accelerator mechanism.
Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) use the framework of Bernanke et al. (1999) to analyse
the e®ect of a non-fundamental shock to the net worth of ¯rms and of a technological
shock. Tetlow (2004) uses a version of Bernanke et al. (1999)'s model as modi¯ed by
Bernanke and Gertler (1999), to study issues raised by the uncertainty regarding the
behaviour of the non-fundamental component of asset prices, namely the robustness
of simple rules. Both these papers share Bernanke and Gertler's \no-reaction" view.
Groth (2003) employs another simpli¯ed version of Bernanke and Gertler's model to
investigate optimal monetary policy under in°ation targeting. Groth concludes that
the discretionary solution is similar to an in°ation-targeting rule and that credibly
promising to be tough on bubbles will reduce their impact.
Without allowing for ¯nancial accelerator e®ects, Dupor (2002) develops a sticky
price-imperfect competition model with endogenous capital accumulation and investment
adjustment costs. As expected, in Dupor's model a non-fundamental increase in
equity prices leads to ine±cient physical investment. Dupor then concludes that the
optimal monetary policy will react to non-fundamental movements in asset prices.
In our analysis we use the dynamic New Keynesian model with endogenous
investment and adjustment costs developed by Casares and McCallum (2000). The
model assumes monopolistic competition and nominal price rigidities to allow for
non-neutral e®ects of monetary policy. We chose to use this model, which has not
previously been used to this end, because it is representative of the type of model
currently in use in macroeconomics. One advantage is that it has a simpler structure
than that of Bernanke et al. (1999), and this will greatly simplify the discussion.
Naturally, being simpler it lacks some of the required ingredients for our discussion.
Therefore, to the basic model we will have to add some terms. These additions will
19make clear the issues being debated and the sources of disagreement in the literature.
4.1 The benchmark model
The original Casares and McCallum's model may be described by the following
equations, which are log-linearised around the steady state:
yt = w1ct + w2xt (8)
ct = Etct+1 ¡ ¯(it ¡ ¼t) + "ct (9)
kt+1 = (1 ¡ ±)kt + ±xt (10)
f2t = ³(yt ¡ kt) (11)
at = ½aat¡1 + "at (12)
¹ yt = (1 ¡ ®)at + ®kt (13)
~ yt = yt ¡ ¹ yt (14)








The variables are the following: y is output, c is consumption, x is investment, i
is the nominal interest rate (the monetary policy instrument), ¼ is in°ation, "c is a
consumption preference shock, k is the stock of capital, f2t is the return on physical
capital, a is technology, "a is a technology shock, ¹ y is \natural" output, ~ y is the
output gap, "¼ is a \supply" shock. We refer the reader to Casares and McCallum
(2000) for details on the derivations, which are similar to those encountered in many
other recent papers.
All variables represent log-percent deviations around the steady state. Equation
(8) is the overall resource constraint with w1 and w2 giving the steady-state shares
of consumption and investment, respectively, in total output. Equation (9) is the
Euler equation for consumption, which depends positively on its own expected next
period value and negatively on the real interest rate, rt = it ¡Et¼t+1. Additionally,
consumption depends on a preference shock, "ct, that may, for instance, be assumed
to follow an AR(1) process.
20Equation (10) is the log-linearised form of the capital accumulation equation.
Equation (11) is the log-linear approximation to the marginal product of capital for
a Cobb-Douglas production form. Equation (12) describes the process followed by
the labour augmenting technology. Equation (13) gives \natural" output, ¹ y, that
is, the output that would prevail if there was no deviation from full price °exibility.
Equation (14) de¯nes the output gap, ~ y, as the deviation of output from its natural
level. As discussed in section 3, welfare maximisation would have this gap as close
to zero as possible.
Equation (15) | the Phillips curve | depicts the price-adjustment process in
the economy. This speci¯cation di®ers from the New Keynesian Phillips curve as
it includes a backward-looking term for in°ation that is believed to match the data
more closely. An equation similar to this hybrid Phillips curve was derived by, e.g.,
Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1999). The backward-looking term re°ects the existence of a
fraction of ¯rms that employ a \rule of thumb" procedure to set their prices. This
equation implies the absence of full price °exibility. There is thus a distortion that
monetary policy may wish to reduce. But it is this very equation that provides a
role to monetary policy in this model: if prices are sticky, changes in the nominal
interest rate will a®ect the real interest rate and thus have e®ects on consumption,
investment and output. Thus, monetary policy must balance its impacts on in°ation
and output.
4.2 Investment
Equation (16) is an \expectational investment equation" as investment, xt, depends
on its own expected next period value. Investment also depends on the di®erence
between the expected return on physical capital, Etf2t+1, and the return on the
¯nancial asset, rt, which Casares and McCallum refer to as the real asset premium.
The coe±cient of this term, ­, should be read as the semi-elasticity of investment
relative to the real asset's premium. It depends on the adopted adjustment cost
speci¯cation and parameterisation. The inclusion of costs in installing capital |
besides its theoretical justi¯cation | results from the fact that, in its absence,
21capital, the marginal product of capital, and the marginal product of labour are
more volatile than observed in the data.
Among the di®erent adjustment cost speci¯cation considered in Casares and
McCallum (2000) we chose that which makes, as shown in Hayashi (1982), the
average value of Tobin's q equal to its marginal value: that is, total adjustment
cost depends not only on the amount of new capital invested but also on the stock
of capital, implying constant returns to scale for the production function net of
adjustment costs. This speci¯cation is of interest to us because, in this case, the
marginal value of Tobin's q, which, in the original Casares and McCallum model,
is a su±cient statistic to determine the level of investment by ¯rms, is equal to the
market value of capital, qt, which is de¯ned below.
The market value of capital, qt, is derived from the optimality condition for
investment decisions and implies that, in equilibrium, the cost of acquiring one
additional unit of capital is equal to the expected present value of next period net











For future reference, notice that, in equilibrium,
qt = ´ (xt ¡ kt) (18)
or, alternatively,
xt = ´¡1qt + kt (19)
i.e., qt is a su±cient statistic for investment, given the capital stock.
4.3 Perfect ¯nancial markets, asset prices and forecasting
The ¯rst thing to notice is that this q variable is irrelevant in the benchmark model:
equation (17) merely states a de¯nition; nothing in the model depends on this q
variable. This is a re°ection of the fact that, with perfect ¯nancial markets, the
stock market is truly just a \sideshow." This is not the same as saying that the
stock market would de¯nitely be of no importance to policymaking in this context.
22Ideally, the policymaker would employ the \optimal" policy rule. This would
entail reacting to the shocks that rock the economy.6 However, it is clear that
identifying these shocks as they occur, and accurately assessing their impact and the
optimal countervailing action, is beyond what actual policymakers are able to do. In
fact, one point on which there seems to be some consensus is that movements in asset
prices may carry information that policymakers should try to interpret, in connection
with other economic developments, in order to better forecast the evolution of the
economy, especially as it concerns output and in°ation. That is to say, looking at
the evolution of a set of variables that include asset prices may help policymakers
identify the type of shock that has occurred.
This is surely what every central bank does, and this is what economists advise
| see, e.g., Gertler, Goodfriend, Issing, and Spaventa (1998), who lean against
including asset prices in the policy rule. The disagreement is on the weight to be
assigned to asset prices. Given that they tend to be very volatile, the direction
of movements in asset prices, especially equity prices, cannot be taken for granted:
they may be reversed within a few hours or days. A cautious approach thus requires
little weight to be attached to them. Perhaps because of their volatility, the empirical
evidence is not supportive of giving an important role to asset prices when forecasting
economic variables | see, e.g., Filardo (2000) and Stock and Watson (2003). The
contrary view is presented in, e.g., Cecchetti et al. (2000) and Goodhart and
Hofmann (2000), but it should be mentioned that the results for what interests us
most here, equity prices, tend to be disappointing. It is housing prices that appear
to have a greater informational content, and are perhaps a more interesting topic for
monetary policy | see, e.g., Selody and Wilkins (2004).
4.4 Imperfections in ¯nancial markets and non-linearities
We have already highlighted the recent trend in macroeconomics that emphasises
the role of ¯nancial markets in the transmission mechanism, thus recovering an old
tradition that goes back at least to the debt-de°ation analysis of the Great Depression
by Fisher (1933). Borio and Lowe (2004) talk of a \comeback from the wilderness."
23The main focus has been on the ¯nancial accelerator that relates changes in
borrowers' net worth to credit conditions. How would this link change our benchmark
model? The simplest way to represent the ¯nancial accelerator in our model would




Etxt+1 + ­[£Etf2t+1 ¡ (it ¡ Et¼t+1)] +
±
1 + ±
kt + g (qt) (20)
All we have done is to introduce a linear function g of current equity prices. This
modi¯cation is a simple way to make investment depend on equity prices, which
act here as a proxy for borrowers' net worth. Increases in asset prices increase the
value of collateral borrowers can o®er, thus increasing credit availability, which is
translated here into more investment.
Given equation (18), it would require only simple algebra to eliminate qt and
transform (20) back into an equation with the same appearance as equation (16).
The only di®erences would be in the coe±cients. What the ¯nancial accelerator
theory tells us is that the new coe±cients would be larger than in the benchmark
model, i.e., the e®ect of any shock to the economy that impacted on investment
would now be magni¯ed.
Viewed in this light, it would appear that nothing substantial has been brought
to the discussion by the ¯nancial accelerator model, just a di®erent amplitude of
°uctuations. However, there are two aspects one must take into consideration here.
The ¯rst is that these ampli¯ed oscillations are due to distortions in ¯nancial markets.
Given that a frictionless model (including full price °exibility) will correspond to
welfare maximisation, it follows that these oscillations are welfare reducing. Therefore,
monetary policy should at least consider the possibility of acting to moderate them |
recall section 3. This is what several papers have studied employing the framework
developed by Bernanke and Gertler (1999) | for example, Gilchrist and Leahy
(2002). The usual conclusion has been that responding to asset prices yields little
gains. Since responding to asset prices could create other problems, to be mentioned
below, the overall conclusion is that these ¯nancial-market imperfections are not
su±cient to justify a monetary policy response to movements in asset prices.
24The second aspect is that this framework actually fails to capture one of the main
features of the literature on ¯nancial markets' imperfections. The reason is that this
framework is linear, while theorists of ¯nancial markets' imperfections often stress
the non-linearities involved. These non-linearities would imply a larger and longer
impact of a fall in asset prices than predicted by linear models. Therefore, it is no
wonder that proponents of \leaning against the wind" of movements in asset prices
should often resort to non-linear models to illustrate their views. Three such models
are presented in Kent and Lowe (1997), Gruen et al. (2003) and Bordo and Jeanne
(2002). Note that the ¯rst two papers assume there is a bubble in asset prices,
whereas the third does not. The third is thus the one that best represents the issues
discussed in this section.
The non-linear nature of a model limits its tractability and demands additional
assumptions. One such assumption is the horizon of the model, typically de¯ned to
encompass little more than a cycle of boom and bust in asset prices. This is required
to allow some tractability, namely solving for rational expectations. The models are
thus geared towards something like a \case-based study": what should monetary
policy do if there is a positive probability that asset prices are to increase by a
certain amount, for a certain number of periods, and then collapse? Additionally,
the increase in asset prices is endogenous: monetary policy may in°uence its pace.
The conclusion reached is that, optimally, monetary policy should use its in°uence
to moderate the rise in asset prices and thus reduce the magnitude of the later fall.
This will reduce the impact of the fall on credit conditions and possibly prevent a
credit crunch. It will also make pre-bust output and in°ation lower than otherwise
on account of the more restrictive policy, i.e., there is a trade-o® between asset price
in°ation stabilisation. If the horizon for nominal price stability is short, then it will
be hard to convince central banks to raise interest rates when no change in in°ation is
foreseen. Proponents of a response to asset prices thus argue for a longer-term view
in monetary policymaking. This would lead current decisions to take into account
the possibility and consequences of future ¯nancial crises. Thus, current decisions
would have to balance the near-term and the longer-term stability goals, and this
25would entail responding to movements in asset prices.
Notice that quantifying these models is di±cult, given the simplifying assumptions
employed. In fact, critics will point out that in practice the central bank does not
know whether, when and how much asset prices will fall. Changing the policy stance
when no problem with in°ation or output is observed would be hard to explain by
the central bank. The central bank also does not know what will the right degree
of monetary tightening be. In addition, there is the possibility that investors may
overreact and that it is monetary policy that actually triggers the collapse in asset
prices. Besides, equity prices are highly volatile, and reacting to them will make the
interest rate also more volatile. This may even lead to indeterminacy.7
Moreover, given that asset prices may be contaminated by bubbles or mistaken
expectations, and are very volatile, perhaps they are not the best source of information
for monetary policymaking. Borio and Lowe (2004) suggest that policymakers should
attempt to identify ¯nancial imbalances in a timely fashion by looking at credit
indicators | see also Borio, Kennedy, and Prowse (1994), Borio and Lowe (2002) and
Posen (2003). This sort of indicators will give a better insight into the evolution of
credit conditions and the likelihood of future ¯nancial crises. It is to these indicators
that monetary policy may wish to respond, not to asset prices. This is one direction
future research is bound to explore.
4.5 Bubbles
The most prominent issue in the debate concerns \bubbles" in asset prices. By
\bubble" we mean any non-fundamental component in asset prices. In the context












If we consider the benchmark model, without the ¯nancial-market imperfections
discussed previously, then the stock market continues to be just a sideshow. The
variable qt would continue to be irrelevant in the model, and so would the bubble. In
26this case, and contrary to the situation envisaged in the previous section, moderating
asset price movements would actually be welfare reducing.8
If we assume that ¯rm managers base their investment decisions on equity prices,
then we would replace equation (16) for investment with equation (19). In such a
model, the non-fundamental shock, when positive, will stimulate investment beyond
what fundamentals suggest. We would thus be assuming the stock market to be
a \faulty active informant" in the terminology of Morck et al. (1990) | i.e., the
information about fundamentals in stock prices may be inaccurate and may therefore
distort investment decisions through false signals to managers.
When this is the case, again there would be reasons to consider whether monetary
policy might be used to counteract the distortions caused by the bubble in asset
prices. Blanchard (2000) argues that \in°ation targeting" | i.e., keeping in°ation,
over a certain horizon, on target | would not be the adequate monetary policy
action. With booming equity prices stimulating investment and output, raising
interest rates only to keep in°ation under control would contract consumption,
while moderating the rise in investment. This is to say, the composition of output
would be changed in favour of investment. In the end, the economy would have
an over-accumulation of capital, which could lead to a painful adjustment of the
economy, through a prolonged recession. Blanchard thus concludes that monetary
policy should respond to movements in asset prices in order to prevent bubbles from
developing and having these undesirable consequences. A similar argument was put
forward by Poole (2001) who asserted that \distorted price signals from the stock
market permitted the industry to raise capital easily and cheaply, which certainly
contributed to the overexpansion" of the US economy in the 1990s.
Though in their model investment decisions are based on fundamentals, with
bubbles a®ecting investment only through the balance-sheet channel, Bernanke and
Gertler (1999) disagree with this view. According to them (and restated in Bernanke
and Gertler, 2001) it only takes a tougher in°ation targeting strategy to deal with
such misalignments. These bubbles will act like demand shocks, increasing investment
demand and causing in°ation. In°ation targeting will obviously counteract such
27tendency. Strong in°ation targeting | stronger interest rate movements in response
to deviations from the in°ation target | will discourage it.
Gruen et al. (2003) present a simple macroeconomic model with a non-linear
bubble element that a®ects output. The interesting thing about their analysis is
that in their model a forward-looking policymaker faced with a bubble situation
may actually want to loosen policy, rather than tightening it. The reason is that,
given the \long and variable" lags deemed to a®ect monetary policy, a policymaker
that expects the bubble to collapse in the near-future may ¯nd it advisable to prepare
the economy for the landing, and start gearing policy towards making it a soft one.
In other words, if the bubble is going to burst and that will contract the economy,
the optimal stabilising action is to loosen monetary policy in advance. In terms of
the model, the stochastic process for the non-fundamental term, Ãqt, should depend
on the stance of monetary policy, besides other elements such as the length of the
boom in asset prices. These would be essentially non-linear features, and thus would
not ¯t well into the usual linear framework.
If a restraining policy discourages bubbles, then one must admit the possibility
that an expansionary monetary policy might actually encourage the continuation
of the bubble. This sort of e®ect has been studied by Miller, Weller, and Zhang
(2002). This paper argues that expectations of a stabilising intervention by the
Federal Reserve in the 1990s, in case equity prices were to fall, may help explain the
run up in asset prices. Stock market investors felt insured against a downfall risk in
equity prices, and thus a \moral hazard" problem developed. It thus seems central
banks are in a di±cult position: increasing interest rates to moderate the rise in asset
prices might prick the bubble; not raising interest rates, but preparing for the worst,
might help the bubble go on. Sellin (2001) provides a survey of work on the impact
of monetary policy on equity prices. The conclusion of this literature seems to be
that monetary policy does in°uence equity prices. Therefore, if monetary policy is
to react to equity prices, it must be careful with feedback e®ects.
284.6 Mistaken expectations
Another deviation from fundamentals might arise from mistaken expectations of
¯rm managers regarding future productivity, such as in Bordo and Jeanne (2002)
and Dupor (2002). In this case, we would add a non-fundamental component, Ãxt,








Again, the additional term, Ãxt, should be seen as a non-fundamental shock. The
introduction of this non-fundamental shock might be seen as representing the fact
that ¯rms will sometimes wrongly estimate the gap between the expected return on
capital and the real interest rate, leading a distortion in investment decisions. The
non-fundamental shock will therefore a®ect investment and, in case stock market
investors believe the ¯rm managers assessments, asset prices. This is similar to
Dupor (2002), where there is a deviation from rational expectations in that ¯rms may
be over- or under-optimistic about the future return to current capital accumulation.
The non-fundamental shock leads to ine±cient investment. Reacting to this shock
depresses consumption and nominal prices. There is a trade-o® between asset price
and nominal price stabilisation when the non-fundamental shock occurs.
Assuming the market follows the ¯rm managers views, qt will, in our model, be
determined by equation (18). Thus qt will carry information about the non-fundamental
element driving investment. This suggests giving asset prices a role in monetary
policy. Dupor argues that optimal monetary policy, which reacts to the non-fundamental
shock, will in his model yield signi¯cant welfare gains. However, this is not a very
clear result to us. What appears to be demonstrated by Dupor is that the optimal
policy manages to eliminate a signi¯cant part of the welfare loss caused by the
non-fundamental shock, not that the loss itself was signi¯cant.
4.7 Summary of model-based discussion
The previous sections demonstrate that there is still a big divide in the literature.
The central banker looking for a de¯nite prescription on the role of asset prices in
29monetary policy will not ¯nd it. The most we can do is follow Gruen et al. (2003)
and say that the adequate monetary policy strategy is a matter for judgement.
At times, central banks will feel some restraint is appropriate to prevent bubbles
from developing. Other times, they will feel asset price movements are likely to be
sustainable and thus no reaction required. The literature surveyed can only point to
issues that should be taken into consideration. One such issue is that what is likely
to matter most are credit conditions, not asset prices. Either way, asset prices by
themselves would not be enough to inform policy. They re°ect a variety of shocks
which have di®erent implications for policy. In fact, Mishkin and White (2002) stress
that crashes in asset prices are important only to the extent that they are associated
with episodes of ¯nancial instability.
4.8 Central banks and asset prices in practice
But have central banks actually responded to asset price movements? The evidence
is mixed. Some empirical studies | such as Cecchetti (2003), Rigobon and Sack
(2003) and Dupor and Conley (2004) | ¯nd that central banks, namely the Federal
Reserve, have responded to asset price °uctuations. Others | such as Fuhrer and
Tootell (2004) and Hayford and Malliaris (2004) for the Federal Reserve, Bohl, Siklos,
and Werner (2003) for the Bundesbank | contend that they have not. Probably,
the correct view is that of Chadha, Sarno, and Valente (2004), who conclude that
central banks in the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan have probably
reacted only occasionally to movements in asset prices, namely to those perceived
to be more dangerous. Borio and Lowe (2004) lean towards the same conclusion,
and add that the reaction has possibly been asymmetric: loosening policy more than
usual when asset prices fall, but not tightening more than usual when asset prices
rise. This asymmetry reminds us of Miller et al. (2002) argument concerning the
danger of a \Greenspan Put" option.
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High investment rates are of great importance for long term growth. Nevertheless,
if, when taking investment decisions, ¯rms are responding to distorted signals from
the stock market, the economy may end up with too much capital. The recent asset
price bubbles in the stock and in the housing markets in the Japanese and in the
US economies, and their burst, have raised a wide discussion on what monetary
policy can and cannot do to avoid the damaging e®ects of ¯nancial crises to the real
economy.
In this paper we have surveyed the recent literature on this topic, with an
emphasis on investment. We used a sticky-price model with endogenous investment
and adjustment costs in order to discuss the potential bene¯ts of monetary policy
reacting to asset prices. The aspects considered were: the usefulness of asset prices
for forecasting, the role of imperfections in ¯nancial markets and possible non-linearities
associated to them, the distortions created by \bubbles" and mistaken expectations
that have an impact on investment.
The issues tackled in the literature go beyond the mere de¯nition of an interest
rate rule. They re°ect di®erent views of how monetary policy is to be evaluated,
which is related to the goals assigned to monetary policy, and how to model the
economy. Di®erent approaches yield con°icting policy recommendations. Those who
support a reaction to asset prices tend to use non-linear models, or stress the fact
that the optimal policy does react to non-fundamental shocks. The opponents tend
to use linear models or attach little weight to the welfare gains from switching from
a simple rule to the optimal rule. They add the remark that reacting to asset prices
could actually be destabilising and therefore not compensate the small welfare gain
of reacting to asset prices. It appears then that calibrating a \¯nancial accelerator"
e®ect does not give much of a role to asset prices in monetary policy, though the
non-linear models might suggest otherwise. Empirical research is needed to elucidate
this matter.
The origin of the shock matters for the decision of whether reacting to asset prices.
31Monetary policy should lean against the wind of signi¯cant asset price movements if
these disturbances originate in the asset markets themselves. Therefore, more e®orts
are needed to improve identi¯cation of the fundamental value of asset prices, to make
it possible to have good estimates of misalignments, and to improve implementation
of monetary policy. Research has also been putting emphasis on credit market
conditions. What these can tell us in connection with designing better policy rules
to avoid ¯nancial crises appears to be a promising topic for future research.
Bene¯ts from reacting to a non-fundamental shock that a®ects investment derive
from a more stable output gap, which is the consequence of a more stable investment.
However, when some form of irrationality a®ects the value of asset prices, an in°ation
targeting regime may result in a misallocation of the economy's resources, with too
much investment at the cost of low consumption. The correction of this imbalance
may be costly. However, asset prices and in°ation may become more stable if the
policy instrument reacts to asset prices in addition to deviations of the expected
in°ation from the target when the economy is hit by a non-fundamental shock. This
would support the argument set forth in Cecchetti et al. (2000) that central bankers
that pursue price stability will more easily reach that target by reacting to asset
prices. However, according to Gruen et al. (2003), the appropriate monetary policy
reaction to a bubble may be loosening rather than tightening. The relation between
monetary policy and asset prices, and the endogeneity of the non-fundamental component,
is also the subject of intense research.
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32Notes
1The main references on the topic of the \¯nancial accelerator," or ¯nancial constraints and
economic activity in general, are Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996), Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). Modi¯ed versions of the model developed by
Bernanke et al. (1999) have been frequently used in this literature. However, Gomes, Yaron, and
Zhang (2003) cast doubt on the empirical adequacy of this type of model. Holt (2003) brings
together ¯nancial constraints and investment irreversibility, and argues that existing empirical work
on investment may be de¯cient due to failing to take both aspects into consideration.
2See Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) for a discussion of the problems with interpreting wealth e®ect
estimates. See Lettau and Ludvigson (2004) for a recent empirical study.
3The data came from Datastream.
4There is a debate as to the descriptive realism of simple rules. On one hand, Taylor (1993)
has argued that a simple rule | the Taylor rule | was a good description of the Federal Reserve's
interest rate policy, and Clarida, Gal¶ ³, and Gertler (1998) have argued that the Bundesbank can be
represented as having set German interest rates in response to a few key variables. On the other
hand, no central bank will admit to using a simple rule: actual central banking requires art besides
science | recall Blinder (1997).
5For a description of this monetary policy regime see, e.g., Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and
Posen (1999).
6In a more general way, the optimal policy could be cast in terms of the state variables of the
model: exogenous variables such as shocks, and predetermined endogenous variables. Given that
the stock price is neither of these, it would not enter the optimal policy rule in the benchmark
model. No one would advocate responding to asset prices in the benchmark model: there are no
non-fundamental °uctuations, nor ¯nancial accelerator e®ects to endanger ¯nancial and macroeconomic
stability. The only disagreement might be on the de¯nition of the price index to be targeted.
Following Alchian and Klein (1973), Goodhart (2000) contends that ideally the price index should
include asset prices, though recognising that is very hard to put in practice.
7A better alternative to reacting to asset prices, some will argue, is to have adequate regulatory
and supervision frameworks | see, e.g, Schwartz (2002). However, White (2004b) argues that the
moral-hazard problem raised by government intervention to limit the impact of ¯nancial crises is
signi¯cant.
8Naturally, one might again argue that in practice a central bank should also look to asset prices
in order to identify the type of shock that is driving the economy, and this might even justify giving
asset prices a role in the simple policy rule used. However, the existence of a (totally uninformative)
bubble in asset prices would tend to reduce the usefulness of such a policy rule | this is an argument
33similar to the one presented in Alexandre and Ba» c~ ao (2005) concerning measurement errors and the
response of monetary policy to asset prices.
References
Alchian, A. A. and B. Klein (1973). On a correct measure of in°ation. Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking 5(1), 173{191.
Alessandri, P. (2004). Bubbles and fads in the stock market: Another look at the
experience of the U.S. Unpublished, Birkbeck College.
Alexandre, F. and P. Ba» c~ ao (2005). Monetary policy, asset prices and uncertainty.
Economics Letters 86(1), 37{42.
Baker, M., J. C. Stein, and J. Wurgler (2002). When does the market matter?
Stock prices and the investment of equity-dependent ¯rms. NBER Working
Paper No. w8750.
Barro, R. J. (1990). The stock market and investment. Review of Financial
Studies 3(1), 115{131.
Bean, C. (2003). Asset prices, ¯nancial imbalances and monetary policy: Are
in°ation targets enough? In A. Richards and T. Robinson (Eds.), Asset Prices
and Monetary Policy, pp. 48{76. Proceedings of the Research Conference of
the Reserve Bank of Australia.
Bernanke, B. and M. Gertler (1999). Monetary policy and asset price volatility.
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review 84(4), 17{51.
Bernanke, B. and M. Gertler (2001). Should central banks respond to movements
in asset prices? American Economic Review 91(2), 253{257.
Bernanke, B., M. Gertler, and S. Gilchrist (1996). The ¯nancial accelerator and
the °ight to quality. Review of Economics and Statistics 78(1), 1{15.
Bernanke, B., M. Gertler, and S. Gilchrist (1999). The ¯nancial accelerator in
a quantitative business cycle framework. In J. B. Taylor and M. Woodford
(Eds.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, Handbooks in Economics, Vol. 15, pp.
1341{1393. Elsevier Science, North-Holland.
34Bernanke, B. and K. N. Kuttner (2004). What explains the stock market's reaction
to Federal Reserve policy? NBER Working Paper No. w10402.
Bernanke, B. S., T. Laubach, F. S. Mishkin, and A. S. Posen (1999). In°ation
Targeting. Lessons from the International Experience. Princeton University
Press.
Blanchard, O. (2000). Bubbles, liquidity traps, and monetary policy. In A. S.
Posen and R. Mikitani (Eds.), Japan's Financial Crisis and Its Parallels to US
Experience, pp. 185{193. Institute for International Economics.
Blanchard, O., C. Rhee, and L. Summers (1993). The stock market, pro¯t, and
investment. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(1), 115{136.
Blinder, A. S. (1997). What central bankers could learn from academics|and vice
versa. Journal of Economic Perspectives 11(2), 3{9.
Bohl, M. T., P. L. Siklos, and T. Werner (2003). Did the bundesbank react to stock
price movements? Economic Research Centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank
Discussion paper 14/03.
Bond, S. and J. Cummins (2001). Noisy share prices and the q model of investment.
IFS working papers WP01/22.
Bond, S., J. Cummins, J. Eberly, and R. J. Shiller (2000). The stock market and
investment in the new economy: some tangible facts and intangible ¯ctions.
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2000(1), 61{124.
Bordo, M. D. and O. Jeanne (2002). Boom-busts in asset prices, economic
instability, and monetary policy. NBER Working Paper No. w8966.
Borio, C. and P. Lowe (2002). Asset prices, ¯nancial and monetary stability:
Exploring the nexus. BIS Working Papers No. 114.
Borio, C. and P. Lowe (2004). Securing sustainable price stability: Should credit
come back from the wilderness? BIS Working Papers No. 157.
Borio, C. E. V., N. Kennedy, and S. D. Prowse (1994). Exploring aggregate asset
price °uctuations across countries: Measurement, determinants and monetary
policy implications. BIS Economic Papers No. 40.
Bosworth, B. (1975). The stock market and the economy. Brookings Papers on
35Economic Activity 1975(2), 257{290.
Bullard, J. B. and E. Schaling (2002). Why the Fed should ignore the stock market.
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 84(2), 35{42.
Casares, M. and B. T. McCallum (2000). An optimizing IS-LM framework with
endogenous investment. NBER Working Paper No. w7908.
Cecchetti, S. G. (2003). What the FOMC says and does when the stock market
booms. In A. Richards and T. Robinson (Eds.), Asset Prices and Monetary
Policy, pp. 77{96. Proceedings of the Research Conference of the Reserve Bank
of Australia.
Cecchetti, S. G., H. Genberg, J. Lipsky, and S. Wadhwani (2000). Asset Prices and
Central Bank Policy. International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies
and CEPR.
Cecchetti, S. G., H. Genberg, and S. Wadhwani (2003). Asset prices in a
°exible in°ation targeting framework. In W. C. Hunter, G. G. Kaufman,
and M. Pomerleano (Eds.), Asset Price Bubbles: Implications for Monetary,
Regulatory, and International Policies, pp. 427{444. MIT Press.
Chadha, J. S., L. Sarno, and G. Valente (2004). Monetary policy rules, asset prices,
and exchange rates. IMF Sta® Papers 51(3), 529{552.
Chirinko, R. S. (1993). Business ¯xed investment spending: Modeling
strategies, empirical results, and policy implications. Journal of Economic
Literature 31(4), 1875{1911.
Chirinko, R. S. and H. Schaller (2001). Business ¯xed investment and \bubbles":
The Japanese case. American Economic Review 91(3), 663{680.
Clarida, R., J. Gal¶ ³, and M. Gertler (1998). Monetary policy rules in practice:
Some international evidence. European Economic Review 42(6), 1033{1067.
Cogley, T. (1999). Should the Fed take deliberate steps to de°ate asset price
bubbles? Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Review 1999(1),
42{52.
Dupor, W. (2002). Nominal price versus asset price stabilization. Paper presented
at the CEPR Annual Workshop on Asset Prices and Monetary Policy at the
36Bank of Finland.
Dupor, W. and T. Conley (2004). The Fed response to equity prices and in°ation.
American Economic Review 94(2), 24{28.
Estrella, A. and J. C. Fuhrer (2002). Dynamic inconsistencies: Counterfactual
implications of a class of rational-expectations models. American Economic
Review 92(4), 1013{1028.
Filardo, A. J. (2000). Monetary policy and asset prices. Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City Economic Review 85(3), 11{37.
Filardo, A. J. (2001). Should monetary policy respond to asset price bubbles?
Some experimental results. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Working
Paper No. 01-04.
Filardo, A. J. (2004). Monetary policy and asset price bubbles: calibrating the
monetary policy trade-o®s. BIS Working Papers No. 155.
Fischer, S. and R. C. Merton (1984). Macroeconomics and ¯nance: The role of
the stock market. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 21,
57{108.
Fisher, I. (1933). The debt-de°ation theory of great depressions.
Econometrica 1(4), 337{357.
Fuhrer, J. C. and G. Tootell (2004). Eyes on the prize:how did the Fed respond to
the stock market? Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Public Policy Discussion
Papers no.04-2.
Gal¶ ³, J. and M. Gertler (1999). In°ation dynamics: A structural econometric
analysis. Journal of Monetary Economics 44(2), 195{222.
Gertler, M., M. Goodfriend, O. Issing, and L. Spaventa (1998). Asset Prices and
Monetary Policy: Four Views. Centre for Economic Policy Research and Bank
for International Settlements.
Gilchrist, S. and C. Himmelberg (1998). Investment, fundamentals and ¯nance.
NBER Working Paper No. w6652.
Gilchrist, S. and J. V. Leahy (2002). Monetary policy and asset prices. Journal of
Monetary Economics 49(1), 75{97.
37Gomes, J. F., A. Yaron, and L. Zhang (2003). Asset prices and business cycles
with costly external ¯nance. Review of Economic Dynamics 6(4), 767{788.
Goodhart, C. (2000). Time, in°ation and asset prices. In M. Silver and D. Fenwick
(Eds.), Proceedings of the Measurement of In°ation Conference. Eurostat,
O±ce for National Statistics and Cardi® University, Cardi® Business School.
Goodhart, C. and B. Hofmann (2000). Do asset prices help to predict consumer
price in°ation? The Manchester School 68(Supplement), 122{140.
Groth, C. (2003). Monetary policy and asset price °uctuations. Paper presented
to the European Economic Association Conference, Stockholm, 2024 August.
Gruen, D., M. Plumb, and A. Stone (2003). How should monetary policy respond
to asset-price bubbles? Paper presented at the ECB workshop \Asset Prices
and Monetary Policy".
Hayashi, F. (1982). Tobin's marginal q and average q: a neoclassical interpretation.
Econometrica 50(1), 213{224.
Hayford, M. D. and A. Malliaris (2004). Monetary policy and the U.S. stock
market. Economic Inquiry 42(3), 387{401.
Holt, R. W. (2003). Investment and dividends under irreversibility and ¯nancial
constraints. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 27(3), 467502.
Hubbard, R. G. (1998). Capital-market imperfections and investment. Journal of
Economic Literature 36(1), 193{225.
Kent, C. and P. Lowe (1997). Asset-price bubbles and monetary policy. Reserve
Bank of Australia Research Discussion Paper: 9709.
King, M. (1997). Changes in UK monetary policy: Rules and discretion in practice.
Journal of Monetary Economics 39(1), 81{97.
Kiyotaki, N. and J. Moore (1997). Credit cycles. Journal of Political
Economy 105(2), 211{248.
Lettau, M. and S. Ludvigson (2004). Understanding trend and cycle in asset
values: Reevaluating the wealth e®ect on consumption. American Economic
Review 94(1), 276{299.
McCallum, B. T. and E. Nelson (1999). Performance of operational policy rules in
38an estimated semiclassical structural model. In J. B. Taylor (Ed.), Monetary
Policy Rules, pp. 15{45. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
Miller, M., P. Weller, and L. Zhang (2002). Moral hazard and the US stock market:
Analysing the 'Greenspan Put'. Economic Journal 112(478), C171{C186.
Mishkin, F. S. (1999). Policy rules for in°ation targeting: Comment. In J. B.
Taylor (Ed.), Monetary Policy Rules, pp. 247{253. Chicago and London:
University of Chicago Press.
Mishkin, F. S. and E. N. White (2002). U.S. stock market crashes and their
aftermath: Implications for monetary policy. NBER Working Paper No. w8992.
Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny (1990). The stock market and
investment: Is the market a sideshow? Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity 1990(2), 157{202.
Poole, W. (2001). What role for asset prices in monetary policy? Speech delivered
at Bradley University, Peoria, Illinois, 5 September.
Posen, A. S. (2003). It takes more than a bubble to become Japan. Institute for
International Economics Working Paper No. 03-9.
Rigobon, R. and B. Sack (2003). Measuring the reaction of monetary policy to
the stock market. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(2), 639{669.
Rotemberg, J. J. and M. Woodford (1999). Interest rate rules in an estimated
sticky price model. In J. B. Taylor (Ed.), Monetary Policy Rules, pp. 57{119.
Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
Rudebusch, G. D. and L. E. O. Svensson (1999). Policy rules for in°ation targeting.
In J. B. Taylor (Ed.), Monetary Policy Rules, pp. 203{246. Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press.
Schwartz, A. J. (2002). Asset price in°ation and monetary policy. NBER Working
Paper No. w9321.
Sellin, P. (2001). Monetary policy and the stock market: Theory and empirical
evidence. Journal of Economic Surveys 15(4), 491{541.
Selody, J. and C. Wilkins (2004). Asset prices and monetary policy: A canadian
perspective on the issues. Bank of Canada Review (Autumn), 3{14.
39Shiller, R. J. (1981). Do stock prices move too much to be justi¯ed by subsequent
movements in dividends? American Economic Review 71(3), 421{436.
Shiller, R. J. (1989). Market Volatility. MIT Press.
Shiller, R. J. (2000). Irrational Exuberance. Princeton University Press.
Sims, C. (2001). A review of monetary policy rules. Journal of Economic
Literature 39(2), 562{566.
Stock, J. H. and M. W. Watson (2003). Forecasting output and in°ation: The role
of asset prices. Journal of Economic Literature 41(3), 788{829.
Svensson, L. E. O. (1997). In°ation forecast targeting: Implementing and
monitoring in°ation targets. European Economic Review 41(6), 1111{1146.
Taylor, J. B. (1993). Discretion versus policy rules in practice. Carnegie-Rochester
Conference Series on Public Policy 39, 195{214.
Taylor, J. B. (Ed.) (1999). Monetary Policy Rules, Chicago and London. University
of Chicago Press.
Taylor, J. B. (2000). Alternative views of the monetary transmission mechanism:
What di®erence do they make for monetary policy? Oxford Review of
Economic Policy 16(4), 60{73.
Tetlow, R. J. (2004). Monetary policy, asset prices, and misspeci¯cation: the
robust approach to bubbles with model uncertainty. Paper presented at the
ECB workshop \Asset Prices and Monetary Policy".
Tobin, J. (1969). A general equilibrium approach to monetary theory. Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking 1(1), 15{29.
Trautwein, H.-M. (2000). The credit view, old and new. Journal of Economic
Surveys 14(2), 155{189.
Walsh, C. E. (1998). Monetary Theory and Policy. Cambridge and London: MIT
Press.
White, E. N. (2004a). Booms and busts: The 1990s in the mirror of the 1920s.
Finance Research Unit, Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen,
Working Paper No. 2004/09.
40White, W. R. (2004b). Are changes in ¯nancial structure extending safety nets?
BIS Working Papers No. 145.
Woodford, M. (1999). Optimal monetary policy inertia. The Manchester
School 67(Supplement), 1{35.
41Most Recent Working Papers 
 
NIPE WP 3/2005  Alexandre, Fernando and Pedro Bação, Monetary Policy and asset 
prices: the investment channel, 2005. 
NIPE WP 2/2005  Conraria, Luís Aguiar and Yi Wen, Understandig the Impact of Oil 
Shocks, 2005. 
NIPE WP 1/2005  Bleaney, Michael and Manuela Francisco, Inflation Persistence and 
Exchange Rate Regimes: Evidence from Developing Countries, 2005. 
NIPE WP 13/2004  Pereira, Nuno, J. Cadima Ribeiro and José Viseu , Sport Tourism: 
Regional Promotion Stategies, 2004. 
NIPE WP 12/2004  Monteiro, Natália Pimenta, Using propensity matching estimators to 
evaluate the impact of privatisation on wages, 2004. 
NIPE WP 11/2004  Monteiro, Natália Pimenta, The Impact of Privatisation on Wages: 
Evidence from the Portuguese Banking Industry, 2004. 
NIPE WP 10/2004  Monteiro, Natália Pimenta, Regulatory Reform and the Portuguese 
Banking Labour Market: two decades later, October 2004. 
NIPE WP 9/2004  de Freitas, Miguel Lebre, Currency Substitution, Portfolio 
Diversification and Money Demand, October 2004. 
NIPE WP 8/2004  Coelho, Cesar, Elections and Governments` Behaviour – An 
Application to Portuguese Municipalities, 2004. 
NIPE WP 7/2004  Conraria, Luís Aguiar, Public vs Private Schooling in a Endogenous 
Growth Model, July 2004. 
NIPE WP 6/2004  Silva, João Carlos Cerejeira da, Estimating the employer size-wage 
Premium in a panel data model with comparative advantage and non-
random selection, May 2004. 
NIPE WP 5/2004  Conraria, Luís Aguiar and Yi Wen, Foreign Trade and Equilibrium 
Indeterminacy, May 2004. 
NIPE WP 4/2004  Veiga, Linda Gonçalves and Francisco José Veiga, Political 
Business Cycles at the Municipal Level, May 2004. 
NIPE WP 3/2004  Ribeiro, José Cadima and José de Freitas Santos, Portuguese olive 
oil and the price of regional products: does designation of origin really 
matter?, February  2004. 
NIPE WP 2/2004  Mourão, Paulo Reis, As disparidades regionais em Portugal: uma 
sugestão a partir de índices sintéticos, January 2004. 
NIPE WP 1/2004  de Freitas, Miguel Lebre, The Dynamics of Inflation and Currency 
Substitution in a Small Open Economy, 2004. 
 